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AN UNCERTAIN PARTICIPANT:  VICTIM INPUT 




Little is understood about the parole release process, as state parole 
boards predominately operate with incredible discretion and keep their 
deliberations and rationales hidden from public view.  Even less is 
understood about the intersection of the inscrutable parole release 
decision-making process and victim rights.  As the victim rights movement 
mobilized in the 1970s, victims, instead of remaining passive witnesses, came 
to wield significant influence over the release decision process.  Today, 
victim participation in parole proceedings is increasing as most parole 
boards proclaim how important victims’ voices are and, in turn, actively 
incorporate victim input into their release calculus. 
Yet, it is not entirely clear what role, if any, victims should have in the 
release process because it is not entirely clear what purposes parole release 
should serve more generally.  Rather than resolving these pressing questions 
that are at the heart of the release decision, the current system gives 
individual parole board members a great degree of discretion when it comes 
to how they approach victim input and the role it should serve.  This 
approach has resulted in a release process that treats victim input in a 
troubling and inconsistent manner, which is unfair to inmates, victims, and 
parole board members alike. 
To make sense of this situation, this Note identifies four analytical 
frameworks for understanding discretionary parole release, which reveal 
board members’ options for approaching victim input.  Ultimately, this Note 
proposes that parole boards should approach the release decision as an 
evaluation of both the inmate’s rehabilitation and the extent to which 
sentencing’s retributive and deterrent goals have been met.  In this vein, 
victim input should only influence the release decision if it provides 
information, not emotion, that the inmate is not rehabilitated or that the 
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judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime 
and that retribution or deterrence has not been met.  In recognition of the 
implications of such an approach, this Note proposes procedural changes to 
the release decision and structural changes to parole boards.  These 
recommended reforms are animated by principles of equity, transparency, 
and procedural justice.  Applying this Note’s approach to victim input in the 
parole process and implementing the corresponding procedural changes can 
hopefully create a system that is fairer for inmates, minimizes risks of 
secondary harms to victims, and protects board members from improper 
external pressures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What role should victims play in the parole release process?  To what 
degree is their input relevant to the purposes of discretionary parole release 
as varied as those purposes may be? 
These pressing questions came to the fore on March 13, 2018, when the 
New York State Board of Parole (“the Board”) controversially granted parole 
for Herman Bell, reopening old and deep wounds for some victims and 
finally achieving closure for others.1  In 1979, Bell, a member of the Black 
Liberation Army at the time of the crime,2 was sentenced to twenty-five years 
to life imprisonment for the murder of two police officers, Joseph A. 
Piagentini and Waverly M. Jones, in Harlem, New York, on May 21, 1971.3  
In 2018, in preparation for Bell’s eighth and final parole hearing, Diane 
Piagentini, the widow of Officer Piagentini, submitted her final written 
victim impact statement,4 which the Board was required to consider under 
New York law.5  Arguing against Bell’s release, Diane Piagentini detailed 
the devastating emotional toll that the crime inflicted on her and her two 
daughters, as well as the resulting post-traumatic stress disorder she 
suffered.6 
Conversely, the children of Officer Jones—Waverly Jones Jr. and Wanda 
Jones—had advocated for Bell’s release.7  Their position was made clear in 
a separate victim impact statement submitted in 2018, likely penned by 
Waverly Jones Jr.8  The letter, as cited by the Board in the release decision, 
stated, “The simple answer is [Bell’s release] would bring joy and peace as 
we have already forgiven [him] publicly . . . .  [T]o deny him parole again 
 
 1. See Al Baker, Man Who Killed 2 Officers in ‘71 Is Released From Prison, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/nyregion/herman-bell-parole.html 
[https://perma.cc/59EJ-ZNU6]. 
 2. The Black Liberation Army was an underground offshoot of the Black Panther Party 
and was known for using radical and violent methods to achieve its political goals.  For further 
reading on the Black Liberation Army, see William Rosenau, “Our Backs Are Against the 
Wall”:  The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America, 36 STUD. 
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 176 (2013). 
 3. See Baker, supra note 1. 
 4. See Piagentini v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 176 A.D.3d 138, 139–40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
 5. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v) (McKinney 2021). 
 6. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 139–40 (discussing details articulated in Diane 
Piagentini’s statement to the parole board), appeal denied, 35 N.Y.3d 906 (2020). 
 7. See Austin Fenner & Brian Harmon, Slain Cop’s Kin Urge Release of One Killer, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2004), https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/slain-kin-
urge-release-killer-article-1.657766 [https://perma.cc/SPA7-J6FV].  However, not all of 
Officer Jones’s family members advocated for the release of those involved in his death. See 
Daniel A. Gross, The Eleventh Parole Hearing of Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, NEW YORKER  
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-eleventh-parole-hearing-of-
jalil-abdul-muntaqim [https://perma.cc/C8NG-KCSQ]. 
 8. Although the victim impact statement was anonymous, every indication suggests that 
it was submitted by Waverly Jones Jr.  See Al Baker, Nearly 5 Decades Later, Man Who Killed 
New York Officers Wins Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/14/nyregion/herman-bell-nypd-parole.html [https://perma.cc/5QRP-8HWQ]; Piagentini, 
176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting). 
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would cause us pain as we are reminded of the painful episode each time he 
appears before the board.”9 
Ultimately, the Board voted two-to-one to release Bell over Diane 
Piagentini’s objections,10 a deviation from the common trend.11  The Board 
cited Bell’s remorse, strong support network, and exemplary disciplinary 
record while incarcerated in support of its decision.12  The Board also directly 
cited the victim letter and described it as a noteworthy factor in its release 
decision but did not directly address Diane Piagentini’s victim impact 
statement.13 
The blowback to the Board’s decision was swift, as opponents decried the 
decision as both disgraceful to victims14 and illegal because it did not 
adequately assess Diane Piagentini’s victim statement.15  Some called for the 
removal of the Board members who voted to release Bell.16  New York City 
Mayor Bill de Blasio, in a letter to the Board, urged the Board to rescind its 
decision arguing Bell’s release would cause too much anguish for the 
victims’ families and questioned whether those who murder officers should 
ever be released on parole.17  As recently as September 2020, in response to 
Bell’s release and other controversial Board decisions,18 some New York 
State lawmakers have proposed legislation that would permit the removal of 
Board members upon a majority vote of the legislature, arguing such political 
 
 9. See Baker, supra note 8. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra Part I.D.2 (describing multiple studies, which reveal that victim participation 
is highly correlated with release denials). 
 12. See Baker, supra note 1; see also Jen Marlowe, After Nearly 45 Years of 
Incarceration, Herman Bell Wins Parole, COLORLINES (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/after-nearly-45-years-incarceration-herman-bell-wins-
parole [https://perma.cc/4V33-A4UV]. 
 13. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting); see also Baker, supra  
note 8. 
 14. See Tina Moore et al., Law Enforcement Rages over Cop Killer’s Parole, N.Y. POST 
(Mar. 14, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/03/14/law-enforcement-rages-over-cop-
killers-parole/ [https://perma.cc/5WFV-6ZCH]; see also Press Release, New York City Police 
Dep’t, The Truth About Herman Bell (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/ 
f0420/the-truth-herman-bell#/0 [https://perma.cc/5XPP-VH92] (“The Parole Board has 
indeed sent a message in releasing him, though the families of Joseph Piagentini [and] 
Waverly Jones . . . may not agree that it is positive or hopeful.”). 
 15. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting). 
 16. See Families, PBA Outraged over Parole for Cop Killer Herman Bell, ABC7 N.Y. 
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://abc7ny.com/parole-board-herman-bell-killing-nypd-pba-patrolmen-
benevolent-association/3220591/ [https://perma.cc/NMG6-Z7YS]. 
 17. Letter from Bill de Blasio, Mayor of the City of New York, to Tina M. Stanford, 
Chairwoman of the New York State Bd. of Parole (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/ 
assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/parole-board-letter-bell.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P479-86S4]. 
 18. See, e.g., Dorian Geiger, Killer and Rapist Who Admitted Brutal Double Murder Was 
Motivated by Hatred of Women Controversially Paroled in NY, OXYGEN (Sept. 3, 2020,  
2:45 PM), https://www.oxygen.com/crime-news/sam-ayala-convicted-of-double-murder-
and-rape-of-2-women-in-1977-paroled [https://perma.cc/C8UV-UBS4] (noting that one of 
the victim’s children described the release as a mockery and argued that the release victimized 
them again). 
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accountability is necessary to ensure the Board adequately considers victims’ 
wishes in its deliberations.19 
While victim input is only one of many factors that the typical parole 
board20 considers,21 the case of Herman Bell highlights just how central a 
role victims occupy in the parole process both in the public imagination and 
in practice.22  More fundamentally, given the Board’s apparent reliance on 
one victim’s statement over another, and the intense public blowback as a 
result, Bell’s case reveals that it is not clear how release decisions should be 
made and what the proper role for victims should be in that process.  Further, 
Bell’s case is not an outlier, as recent similar cases have occurred that prompt 
the same questions.  On August 27, 2021, a two-member panel of California 
parole board members recommended that Sirhan B. Sirhan be released on 
parole after appearing before board members sixteen times and spending over 
fifty years in jail for the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.23  As 
in Herman Bell’s case, there were victims who advocated for24 and against 
release.25  While the panel recommendation could still be reviewed by the 
full Board as well as reversed by California Governor Gavin Newsom,26 it 
again showcases the centrality of victims in the process, at least from the 
public’s perspective, and begs the question of how victims ought to fit into 
that process.  Rather than resolving these important questions, the current 
system across many states gives parole boards great discretion when it comes 
 
 19. Bernadette Hogan, GOP State Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Strengthen Parole Board 
Oversight, N.Y. POST (Sept. 29, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/09/29/state-gop-
introduces-bill-to-strengthen-parole-board-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/XT2Q-BS6F]. 
 20. For the sake of uniformity, this Note refers to the institution in charge of discretionary 
parole release as “boards” throughout, even though some states refer to their boards by 
different names. 
 21. See EBONY L. RUHLAND ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., THE 
CONTINUING LEVERAGE OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES:  FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 26 
(2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/final_national_ 
parole_survey_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP5X-M76E] (reporting that states considered 
victim input but also consider up to eighteen other factors). 
 22. For further discussion on just how central a role victims can play in the parole process, 
see infra Part I.D.2. 
 23. See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Parole Board Recommends Release of Sirhan Sirhan, 
Robert F. Kennedy’s Assassin, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2021/08/27/us/sirhan-sirhan-parole-rfk.html [https://perma.cc/BA6H-EVBU]. 
 24. See id. (detailing that one of Mr. Kennedy’s sons, Douglas Kennedy, attended the 
hearing, pushed for release, and stated “I do have some love for you” while, another son, 
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., sent the board a letter arguing for Mr. Sirhan’s release). 
 25. See Rory Kennedy, Opinion, Robert Kennedy Was My Dad.  His Assassin Doesn’t 
Deserve Parole., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/ 
opinion/sirhan-sirhan-parole-kennedy.html [https://perma.cc/UNX7-A7HD]; see also Ray 
Sanchez & Cheri Mossburg, Board Recommends Parole For RFK Assassin Sirhan Sirhan on 
16th Attempt, CNN (Aug. 28, 2021, 1:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/27/us/sirhan-
sirhan-parole-rfk-assassination/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BJV-URKS].  Six of Kennedy’s 
children issued a statement, which read, in part:  “Our father’s death is a very difficult matter 
for us to discuss publicly and for the past many decades we have declined to engage directly 
in the parole process . . . .  We adamantly oppose the parole and release of Sirhan Sirhan and 
are shocked by a ruling that we believe ignores the standards for parole of a confessed, 
first-degree murderer in the state of California.” Id. 
 26. See Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 23. 
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to how they approach victim input and consider the purposes it should 
serve.27  This has created a system that produces inconsistent and troubling 
results, which is unfair to inmates, victims, and parole board members 
alike.28 
This Note offers a proposal for the way victim input should be evaluated 
in the parole release context.  It argues that the release decision should be 
approached as a quasi-judicial act concerned only with the rehabilitation of 
the inmate and whether the retributive and deterrent principles of sentencing 
have been met.29  It then concludes that victim input should only influence 
the release decision if it provides information, other than emotion, that 
demonstrates either that the inmate is not rehabilitated, or that the sentencing 
judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime, 
and thus the needs of retribution and deterrence have not been met.30 
To compensate for the implications of this proposal, this Note:   
(1) proposes that states clarify and codify the proper role of victim input in 
parole release decisions and (2) urges state legislatures to implement 
institutional changes to their parole boards and procedural changes to release.  
Such reforms are necessary to both prevent parole boards from being overly 
retributive- or deterrence-focused, which can lead to a crush of denials, and 
to better protect victims from secondary harms. 
Part I of this Note examines the function and history of discretionary 
parole release in the United States and the way it has intersected with victim 
rights to demonstrate the current influence of victim participation on parole 
release.  Part II explores the ambiguous purpose that victim input serves in 
parole release decision-making and the way it results in inconsistent 
treatment of victim input.  Drawing on theory and practice, it describes four 
analytical frameworks for understanding how parole boards make release 
decisions and how each approach treats victim input differently.  Part III 
posits that release decisions should be approached as a form of resentencing 
that is concerned only with the inmate’s rehabilitation and the goals of 
sentencing.  Thus, this Note concludes that victim input should only be 
relevant to the release decision if it speaks to these two elements.  
Furthermore, Part III proposes procedural and institutional reforms necessary 
to implement this approach. 
I.  VICTIMS IN THE PAROLE HEARING ROOM 
This part provides a brief history of discretionary parole release in the 
United States, how it functions today, and how it has intersected with the 
victim rights movement.  In addition, it discusses the level of influence that 
victim input has had on the release decision in practice. 
 
 27. See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
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A.  Discretionary Parole Release in the United States:  A Turbulent History 
Parole traces its roots in the United States back to 1876, when it was first 
implemented at the New York State Reformatory for Juveniles in Elmira 
(“Elmira”).31  In response to the old penological system’s failure to achieve 
rehabilitation, Elmira instituted indeterminate sentencing, in which an inmate 
could “work out his own salvation” and then be granted conditional 
supervised release if deemed fit.32  This innovation, commonly known as 
parole, aimed to foster and achieve rehabilitation.33  Further, it incentivized 
good behavior among the prison population,34 reduced overcrowding in 
prisons,35 and reduced prison expenses dramatically.36  In fact, the Supreme 
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer37 stated that the “purpose [of parole] is to help 
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they 
are able . . . .  It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an 
individual in prison.”38 
The Elmira approach proved popular,39 and by 1922, practically every 
state implemented an indeterminate sentencing regime whereby a judge 
would sentence an individual to a minimum and maximum term of 
imprisonment and then the parole board would assess when to grant that 
individual supervised parole release within that range.40  In this sense, the 
judiciary and parole board worked together to determine a criminal 
defendant’s true period of incarceration. 
Then, between the 1970s and the 1990s, states moved toward greater 
determinacy in sentencing, in which a judge determined very closely the 
exact release date through sentencing, and the parole board’s release 
authority was heavily curtailed.41  This was, in part, due to a rising “tough on 
crime” movement that viewed as suspect rehabilitation as an underlying 
principle of parole.42  Additionally, there was concern among the public and 
 
 31. See NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 15  
(2d ed. 1983). 
 32. See Alexander W. Pisciotta, Scientific Reform:  The “New Penology” at Elmira, 
1876–1900, 29 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 613, 616 (1983). 
 33. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma:  Consequences of Failing 
to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 499 (2008). 
 34. See id. at 499–500. 
 35. See Dashka Slater, Can You Talk Your Way Out of a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/01/magazine/prison-parole-california.html 
[https://perma.cc/7W4Z-JHV7]. 
 36. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 20; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release 
Reform and American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 2751 (2020). 
 37. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
 38. Id. at 477. 
 39. Id. (discussing that, since 1912, parole “has become an integral part of the penological 
system”). 
 40. See Slater, supra note 35. 
 41. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 9. 
 42. See id. (detailing how the public’s desire for greater severity in sentencing and the 
difficulty of determining when one was rehabilitated led to decreased support for parole 
among legislators, scholars, and the public). 
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state legislatures over a lack of transparency in the parole release process.43  
Thus, states eschewed the rehabilitative ideals of indeterminacy and turned 
toward stiffer determined sentences.44  This change in the tides led nearly 
twenty states to abolish their parole regimes or limit the scope of their boards’ 
discretion and culminated with the federal government’s abolition of federal 
parole with the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.45 
Despite these setbacks, discretionary parole release has witnessed a 
renewed interest,46 reassuming its place as a crucial element in the U.S. 
criminal justice system.47  The majority of states today have indeterminate 
sentencing regimes, in which the state parole boards retain discretionary 
release authority,48 and other states have boards that retain discretionary 
release authority over specific inmate populations.49  In fact, at least 187,052 
inmates were granted discretionary release in the United States in 2016.50  
Due to budget constraints and worsening prison overcrowding, many 
scholars and prison officials have concluded that discretionary parole is 
likely to grow in prominence, as it has proven to effectively reduce prison 
overcrowding.51  Some prominent U.S. senators have even begun to explore 
reestablishing federal parole.52 
 
 43. See id.; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Prepping for Parole, NEW YORKER  
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/02/prepping-for-parole 
[https://perma.cc/63XR-5GZV] (discussing how an official state investigation in New York 
in the 1970s found that the “decisions of the parole board are fraught with the appearance of 
arbitrariness”). 
 44. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 501. 
 45. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 46. See Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279, 280 
(2017) (“At least one state, Mississippi, recently expanded its parole granting function . . . .  
Others are considering restoring parole release as part of a larger program to lower 
incarceration rates.”). 
 47. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 503 (stating that the population under parole 
supervision has tripled from 1980 to 2000). 
 48. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2742; see also Edward E. Rhine et al., Parole Boards 
Within Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Structures, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & 
CRIM. JUST. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/parole-boards-within-
indeterminate-and-determinate-sentencing-structures [https://perma.cc/FA59-K9VE] 
(detailing that 34 states still have discretionary release authority within an indeterminate 
sentencing regime). 
 49. See Rhine et al., supra note 48 (explaining that these specific inmate populations are 
those serving life terms and/or those who committed crimes prior to the passage of the 
determinate sentencing system). 
 50. DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2016, at 20 (2016). 
 51. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 504.  But see Reitz, supra note 36, at 2745–50 (arguing 
that discretionary release is in part to blame for rising prison populations, but if managed 
better, discretionary release can in fact reduce prison overcrowding more effectively than other 
methods). 
 52. See Rory Fleming, Lindsey Graham Remarks Offer Hope for Reinstatement of Federal 
Parole, FILTER MAG. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://filtermag.org/lindsey-graham-federal-parole/ 
[https://perma.cc/4H9W-CE3X]. 
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Yet, criticisms of discretionary parole release remain because board 
decision-making processes are likened to an inscrutable “black box,”53 as the 
process for the decision-making is not so transparent.54  This is principally 
due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,55 which held that inmates have 
no liberty interest in the parole release process and thus are afforded no due 
process rights therein unless the parole system of a given state specifically 
grants such an interest.56  For example, a liberty interest is created when the 
state statute governing parole provides that a state shall release an inmate if 
certain factors are met.57  However, even in cases in which such a liberty 
interest is established, the due process afforded is still minimal.  In 
Greenholtz, the Court held that Nebraska’s parole system had created a 
liberty interest in release but that the board satisfied due process because it 
provided the inmate with an opportunity to be heard and a brief description, 
with no corroborating evidence, of how he fell short of qualifying for parole 
release.58  In its ruling, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s requirement 
that the Nebraska parole board give “a full and fair explanation, in writing, 
of the essential facts relied upon and the reasons for denial of parole.”59  
Further, the Court held that states can be general in how they define the 
factors parole boards should consider in their release determinations to afford 
themselves wide latitude in making these “‘equity’ type judgment[s] that 
cannot always be articulated in traditional findings.”60 
Therefore, in the current landscape, due process protections do not attach 
to the parole release process unless a state explicitly says they do, and parole 
boards are afforded broad discretion to determine how to weigh the multiple 
factors at their disposal.61  Further, boards need not carefully explain the 
rationales underlying their decisions.62  This has had the effect of 
discouraging inmate appeals of release decisions, as courts and 
administrative review are highly deferential to board decisions.63  Thus, to 
better understand discretionary release, one must examine the 
decision-making process in practice. 
 
 53. RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 10. 
 54. See id. at 9, 33 (highlighting that 41 percent of parole boards never even make public 
their rationale for a denial). 
 55. 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 56. See id. at 1, 7, 11–12. 
 57. See id. at 11–12. 
 58. See id. at 13, 16. 
 59. See Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1285  
(8th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 60. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8, 13. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id.; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 315 n.44 (finding that when rationales 
are required for parole decisions, boilerplate explanations are more than sufficient to satisfy 
judicial review of release decisions). 
 63. See, e.g., Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 315–16. 
798 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
B.  To Release or Not to Release?:  How the Decision Is Made 
This section discusses the typical parole decision-making process and the 
structure of parole boards and examines the release factors considered at 
release hearings. 
1.  The Members of the Board 
While each state has developed its own parole system, the basic approach 
to parole release is rather uniform across the United States.64  Most state 
parole boards are made up of fewer than a dozen members, with only 
approximately 350 board members nationwide.65  The governor of a state 
typically appoints members to the board,66 and board members can be 
removed as easily as they are appointed.67  Accordingly, the board is 
principally politically accountable.68 
On the whole, parole board members “enjoy low professional status, high 
job insecurity, and no insulation from media and political reprisals” when 
release decisions go wrong.69  In fact, parole boards themselves cite political 
vulnerabilities, such as the threat of job loss or political retaliation for an 
unpopular decision and the pressure to limit risk, as the greatest problems 
they face.70  Coinciding with this vulnerability, there are few required 
credentials for appointment to a parole board—educational, 
experience-based, or otherwise.71  The eligibility requirements in the states 
that do have formal requirements are often vague and open-ended, and the 
expectations for knowledge or expertise are low.72  Thus, a consistent source 
of criticism for boards nationwide is that board members lack the credentials 
needed for the complex job with which they are tasked.73 
2.  The Parole Hearing Process 
The parole hearing is an administrative hearing to determine whether an 
inmate should be released from prison to conditional supervision.  Statutes 
that describe when an inmate is suitable for release are often written in 
general terms, which provide boards with significant discretion regarding 
 
 64. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 10–14. 
 65. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2743. 
 66. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 18. 
 67. Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286. 
 68. See Alejo Rodriguez, The Obscure Legacy of Mass Incarceration:  Parole Board 
Abuses of People Serving Parole Eligible Life Sentences, 22 CUNY L. REV. F. 33, 52–53 
(2019) (documenting former New York Governor George Pataki’s capricious political 
influence on parole decisions). 
 69. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2748–49. 
 70. See id. at 2750; see also KALEENA J. BURKES ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. 
JUST., RELEASING AUTHORITY CHAIRS:  A COMPARATIVE SNAPSHOT ACROSS THREE DECADES 
20 (2017), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/ 
parole_chairs_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BBA-DC2Y]. 
 71. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 286–88. 
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their assessment of individual cases.74  Common principles underlying parole 
release are:  (1) recidivism (i.e. whether there is a reasonable probability the 
inmate will violate the law again),75 (2) whether release is compatible with 
the welfare of society, and (3) whether release would devalue the seriousness 
of the crime for which the inmate was convicted.76 
Further, there is overwhelming consensus on the release criteria 
considered by states.77  Those most commonly considered by parole boards 
are divided among:  (1) static factors, which an inmate cannot change during 
their period of incarceration; (2) dynamic factors, which account for the 
inmate’s behavior while in prison; and (3) opinion factors proffered by third 
parties.78  The most important static factors are the nature of the underlying 
offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record.79  Dynamic factors include 
the inmate’s prison program participation, disciplinary record while 
incarcerated, and importantly, the inmate’s demeanor and testimony at the 
actual parole hearing.80  As for opinion factors (in essence, input from 
interested third parties), victim input is the one factor that is nearly 
universally assessed.81  Every state permits written victim impact statements 
and nearly every state allows victims to provide in-person testimony.82  
Further, beyond simply permitting this input, thirty-nine of forty responding 
parole boards stated in a survey that they do factor victim input into their 
release decision-making processes.83 
All these factors are contemplated at the parole hearing.  The hearing, in 
popular imagination and often in practice, consists of a panel of board 
members who make a release decision after a discussion with the inmate.84  
 
 74. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021) (“Discretionary release 
on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance 
of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such 
inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for law.”). 
 75. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 23–27 (discussing risk assessment tools parole 
boards rely on, as well as board members’ own views of risk of recidivism, as important 
factors). 
 76. Many systems prohibit release if release:  (1) would substantially depreciate the 
seriousness of the crime, (2) is incompatible with the welfare of society, or (3) undermines 
respect for the law. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021); see also 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (2021) (requiring that release not be incompatible with the welfare 
of society).  In addition, some states task boards with weighing the sufficiency of time served 
or severity of the offense. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-9-40(a) (2021); TEX. GOV’T CODE 
§ 508.144(a)(2) (2021). 
 77. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 25. 
 78. See id. at 26. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 25. 
 81. See Sarah French Russell, Review for Release:  Juvenile Offenders, State Parole 
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 400, 404–05 (2014) (finding that of 
the 45 states that responded to a 2012 survey, all indicated they consider victim input). 
 82. See id. at 400–05; see also RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 28. 
 83. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 26 (finding that 97.5 percent of responding 
states consider victim input). 
 84. See id. at 32–34; see also Slater, supra note 35. 
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The reality, though not terribly far off, differs by state based on the twin 
constraints of time and resources.85  The interview with the inmate is 
synonymous with the hearing in a majority of states, and most often board 
members themselves conduct the interview and make a release decision soon 
afterward.86  These interviews are often in-person, but they can also be done 
via phone or video conference.87  However, victims also play a role at these 
hearings.  When there is a hearing in which both board members and the 
inmate are present, roughly half of states allow for victim testimony at the 
hearing.88  Some allow victims to be present but not to speak, while others 
do not allow victims to be present at all.89 
Typically, a panel of board members presides over the release hearing and 
can grant release only upon a majority vote.90  Inmates have a limited ability 
to appeal or challenge the decision.  Some states permit parole boards to deny 
release and force the inmate to serve the maximum sentence with no 
possibility of future release.91  Most states allow for an appeal pursuant to 
either statute or administrative policy, but some states do not even entitle 
inmates to appeal a parole denial.92  And, given Greenholtz, it is very difficult 
to overturn a parole denial, as courts are highly deferential to the parole 
boards’ broad discretion.93  However, even in the absence of meaningful 
appeal, most inmates do have recourse in that they are given periodic 
reconsideration for parole release, often once every two years,94 unless the 
parole board has disqualified them from periodic review.95 
Lastly, the depth of consideration a parole board dedicates to an individual 
inmate during the release process varies considerably.  In Colorado, for 
example, studies have revealed what is termed a “conveyor belt” approach to 
parole decisions, in which cases are handled in mere minutes.96  On the other 
hand, in California, the process can be incredibly long, personal, and 
 
 85. See Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in the Dark and Behind 
Bars, WASH. POST (July 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-power-and-
politics-of-parole-boards/2015/07/10/49c1844e-1f71-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JBS-EEKK]. 
 86. See Russell, supra note 81, at 400–01. 
 87. See id.  In New Jersey, an administrative hearing officer interviews the inmate, who 
writes recommendations to a panel of board members; the inmate subsequently has an 
additional interview with a panel of board members who then make a release decision. 
Division of Release, N.J. STATE PAROLE BD., https://www.nj.gov/parole/ 
functions/release-division/ [https://perma.cc/F9JZ-NDN7] (Sept. 9, 2021). 
 88. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29 (finding that twenty-three of forty 
responding states permit victims to be present and speak at a parole hearing that is also 
attended by the inmate). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 30. 
 91. See id. at 33. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). 
 94. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 21–22. 
 95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 510. 
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draining, as board members can interrogate inmates for hours,97 and victims 
can speak at length about the impact the crime has had on them.98  On the 
whole, however, parole boards are severely limited in the amount of time 
they can afford to review each individual case.99 
3.  How the Factors Are Assessed 
While there is a great degree of uniformity in the factors parole boards 
assess in their decision-making processes, there is less unanimity in weighing 
a particular factor.  As an initial matter, it is hard to know how factors are 
given weight because more than two-thirds of parole boards do not publicize 
their deliberations.100  In addition, sixteen states do not even publish their 
rationale for a denial.101  Further, some boards’ explanations of their release 
decisions are hardly informative, as their rationales are often short one-line 
sentences that can be unrevealing; for example, “The Board concludes that 
you should serve more of your sentence prior to release on parole.”102 
However, drawing from a survey of twenty-nine individual board 
members, a somewhat clearer picture begins to form.  The “first tier” 
factors—the most important factors—were the “nature” or “severity” of the 
underlying crime and any other criminal record of the inmate eligible for 
parole.103  The “second tier” factors represented inmate conduct while 
incarcerated and were reflected in program participation, disciplinary 
records, and other actuarial tools that determine risk.104  The “third tier” 
factors were opinion factors, including inmate testimony as the most 
important and sentencing judge input, prosecutor input, and the offender’s 
family input as even less important.105  There was one notable exception to 
the trend that opinion factors are the least important:  victim input.106  In fact, 
the importance of victim input has increased dramatically over time relative 
to other opinion factors.107  The importance of victim input to the release 
decision traces the rise of the victim rights movement, which calls for greater 
involvement of victims in all aspects of the criminal justice process. 
 
 97. See Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights:  Implementation, 
Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431, 444–45 (2016); see also Slater, supra note 35. 
 98. See Young, supra note 97, at 457. 
 99. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 n.26 (describing that some board members have 
between three and twenty minutes to make a release decision). 
 100. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29. 
 101. Id. at 33. 
 102. See, e.g., VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, PAROLE DECISIONS FOR OCTOBER 2020,  
WITH REASONS (2020), https://vpb.virginia.gov/files/1185/vpb-decisions-oct20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8CE-V7EV]. 
 103. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 26–27. 
 104. Id. at 27. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. BURKES ET AL., supra note 70, at 23–24. 
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C.  The Victim Rights Movement and Parole 
Prior to the 1970s, the prosecutorial goal to convict defined the extent of 
victim involvement in the criminal justice system.108  The interest in the 
concept of victim rights gained traction with the publication of the seminal 
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982, 
which noted that the current criminal justice system “burdened” rather than 
protected crime victims.109  The report spawned a movement that pushed 
successfully for greater victim involvement in all aspects of the criminal 
justice system, from sentencing to parole.110 
The movement sought to prevent the distinct problem of secondary 
victimization—in which the government’s lack of care toward the victim 
inflicts harm beyond that of the original crime111—and impress on judges 
and prosecutors that behind the state are people with their own interests.112  
Victims’ interests include having a voice in the process, maintaining their 
dignity and respect, and healing after the underlying crime, which 
collectively can reduce feelings of helplessness and disillusionment with the 
justice system.113 
However, there are different approaches to realizing those specific 
interests.  One is for the state to afford victims an instrumental role with direct 
influence on the punishment process itself.114  Another is to provide victims 
an expressive role, whereby victims have an opportunity to share their 
experience for cathartic and therapeutic purposes even though their 
testimony would not impact the decision.115  For both approaches, procedural 
justice theorists have posited that an evaluation of a decision’s fairness is not 
based solely on the outcome but rather on the process by which the decision 
 
 108. See Young, supra note 97, at 435. 
 109. LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
VICTIMS OF CRIME 76, 114 (1982), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/ 
document/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS63-MN9G]. 
 110. See Young, supra note 97, at 435–39. 
 111. See DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 30–31 (2019). 
 112. See Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and Parole:  The Effect 
of Victim Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 333, 335–36 
(2005). 
 113. See Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence over 
Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 758 (2002); see 
also Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective, 17 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 299–301 (2020). 
 114. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 336.  But see Robinson, supra note 113, at 
755–57 (challenging the propriety of such schemes, as direct victim influence causes a host of 
problems given that victims are not impartial and can contribute to disparities in punishment 
since some want more lenient sentences and others push for harsher sentences). 
 115. See Robinson, supra note 113, at 755–57. Additionally, in the parole context, some 
states offer victims post-conviction opportunities to meet with their offender to discuss their 
feelings and other questions they may have to make sense of the crime. See Victim Offender 
Dialogue, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/victims/restorative-justice/victim-
initiated-restorative-practices/victim-offender-dialogue/ [https://perma.cc/UW8X-KKHF] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
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was reached.116  If the process itself is unfair, victims may question the 
legitimacy of the proceedings and find themselves revictimized.117  
However, if the process is fair, it can provide the victims with a positive 
experience in which they are not revictimized, even if they ultimately 
disagree with the final decision.118  To achieve such a process, these 
procedural justice theorists argue the process must be fashioned to ensure 
that:  (1) victims can share their experiences, (2) the decision-maker is 
neutral, (3) victims view the decision-maker as attentive and trustworthy, and 
(4) victims are treated with respect throughout the process.119 
While there are different ways to champion victim interests generally, 
victims’ rights in the parole context have expanded dramatically such that 
victim input at parole hearings is almost as common as it is at sentencing.120  
Lobbying on behalf of victims has led parole boards to establish 
much-needed victim services offices121 and to expand victim notification 
systems to alert victims about any case developments.122  Rather than 
relegate victims to an expressive role, many states provide victims an 
instrumental role in the process by actively considering victim input when it 
comes to the release decision.123  However, as the Herman Bell and Sirhan 
B. Sirhan cases reveal, there is a real probability of parole boards 
inconsistently treating victim input which can lead to unmet expectations for 
victims and inmates alike. 
D.  The Dramatic Yet Inconsistent Effect of Victim Input 
This section describes, first, what information victims provide and, second, 
how victim input has affected the release decision since parole boards began 
permitting their input. 
 
 116. Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise:  Procedural Justice, the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected from the 
Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 85 (2010). 
 117. See id. at 86–92. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. at 90–91. 
 120. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim:  Evaluating Victim Input at 
Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 382 (2009). 
 121. See, e.g., Victims’ Rights in the Parole Process, GA. STATE BD. OF PARDONS  
& PAROLES, https://pap.georgia.gov/georgia-office-victim-services/victims-rights-parole-
process [https://perma.cc/HKZ5-D424] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Victims Services, STATE 
OF IOWA BD. OF PAROLE, https://bop.iowa.gov/victim-services [https://perma.cc/U3E2-K57D] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Victim Services:  Information for Crime Victims, N.J. STATE 
PAROLE BD., https://www.nj.gov/parole/functions/victim-services/ [https://perma.cc/K342-
8QTP] (May 24, 2021). 
 122. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 348, 383. 
 123. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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1.  What Are Victims Saying? 
Most victims attend and submit testimony to oppose an inmate’s 
release,124 but some victims advocate for release.125  Precisely what victims 
say in their impact statements is not always known, as most states keep victim 
input confidential.126  A select few states provide victim input to the inmate, 
and a handful more provide the information to the inmate if it is disclosed in 
a public hearing.127 
The information victims provide either for or against release varies 
considerably because states offer scant guidance to victims when they solicit 
information from them.  For example, many states explicitly ask victims for 
their opinion on whether an inmate should be released but do not say if they 
should offer specific evidence in support of their opinion.128  Parole boards 
often encourage a subjective interpretation of relevance129 by asking victims 
to share any information they would like the board to consider when making 
its decision.130  In Alabama, for example, the board allows victims to be 
present at an inmate’s parole hearing and give any reason whatsoever for why 
an inmate should not be released.131  When being most specific, parole boards 
ask victims to detail the continuing effects of the crime, such as financial loss 
or inability to work, and other relevant information that would help the board 
determine the likelihood an offender might commit a new crime upon 
release.132 
While little is known about the substance of these confidential victim 
impact statements, in reality, victims only attend approximately 10 percent 
of release hearings.133  Possible reasons for low attendance could be a desire 
to avoid reliving crimes that are too painful, impracticability to attend, or 
even a lack of interest.134  Interestingly, many California board members 
believe the rate of victim attendance is higher (between 20 and 30 percent), 
reflecting that victims’ participation likely looms large in some board 
 
 124. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317. 
 125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 126. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Victims’ Rights in the Parole Process, supra note 121 (“The [victim] can object 
to future parole and say why, or the writer can simply ask to be notified before any final parole 
decision is made.”); see also Making a Statement:  Victim Input into the Parole Process, PA. 
OFF. OF THE VICTIM ADVOC., https://www.ova.pa.gov/Documents/ 
Making%20a%20Statement%20English.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZZP-PPXN] (stating that the 
victim advocate at the direction of the victim can petition the board to deny parole). 
 129. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 388–89. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Victim Services Brochure, ALA. BUREAU OF PARDONS & PAROLES, 
https://paroles.alabama.gov/victim-services/ [https://perma.cc/9B7T-LFS5] (last visited Sept. 
17, 2021). 
 132. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 388 (discussing the approach to victim input in New 
Jersey). 
 133. Young, supra note 97, at 456. 
 134. See id. at 480, 489. 
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members’ minds.135  The next section discusses the precise effect victim 
input has on the parole release process. 
2.  The Effect of Victim Input 
Multiple studies have concluded that victim input can be—and often is—
a decisive factor in parole release decisions.  The first empirical study on the 
subject, conducted in 1994 in Pennsylvania, found that parole was denied at 
a rate of 43 percent when victim testimony was presented, as opposed to a 
rate of 7 percent when it was not.136  Although based on a small sample, this 
1994 study pointed to an alarming phenomenon.  Subsequent studies and 
surveys have verified this finding, with one interview eliciting an 
administrator of a board to comment that “where no victim impact statements 
are available for board review, 40 to 50 percent of parole applications are 
denied; where statements are submitted, the rate of parole denial rises sharply 
to approximately 80 percent.”137  In addition, studies conducted in 
Alabama138 and California139 found that when victims or their next of kin 
testify at a parole hearing, board members are far less likely to grant 
parole.140  The Alabama study found that written victim statements had a 
profound impact on release—oral testimony even more so—and that victim 
participation, in general, was the second-best predictor of a release denial.141 
Additionally, inmates believe victims wield influence over the release 
decision.142  One study “found that almost a third of parole board 
interviewers believed that prisoners postponed or waived hearings because 
of the likely presence of the victim.”143  In the same study, thirteen board 
members also stated that victim presence has a negative impact on the inmate 
as it could hamper their performance at the hearing.144  Perhaps, this fear 
 
 135. See id. at 456. 
 136. See William Parsonage et al., Victim Impact Testimony and Pennsylvania’s Parole 
Decision-Making Process:  A Pilot Study, 6 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 187, 194 (1992). 
 137. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 339. 
 138. See Brent L. Smith et al., The Effect of Victim Participation on Parole Decisions:  
Results from a Southeastern State, 8 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 57, 71 (1997) (finding that victim 
input is a highly significant predictor of parole decision-making in that the number of releases 
decreases when victims participate in the process); see also Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, 
at 354, 357 (“The more victim participation present relative to the offender, the more likely 
that parole will be denied . . . .  The more letters of protest in an offender’s file, the more 
persons protesting at an offender’s hearing, the more likely that parole will be denied.”). 
 139. ROBERT WEISBERG ET AL., LIFE IN LIMBO:  AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR 
PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA  
5 (2011), https://law.stanford.edu/index.php?webauth-document=child-page/164096/doc/ 
slspublic/SCJC_report_Parole_Release_for_Lifers.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3D-D26K] 
(finding that the grant rate when victims attend is less than half the rate than when victims do 
not attend). 
 140. See supra notes 138–39. 
 141. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 355–57. 
 142. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317. 
 143. See id. at 317–18. 
 144. Kim Polowek, Victim Participatory Rights in Parole:  Their Role and the Dynamics 
of Victim Influence as Seen by Board Members 126–27 (2005) (Ph.D. dissertation,  
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stems from the fact that parole boards are rarely forthcoming about their 
reasons for denial145 and are known to avoid making controversial decisions, 
such as releasing an inmate over a victim’s wishes.146 
In addition, many board members perceive that victims have a profound 
effect on the release decision-making process.  A survey found that 40 
percent of board members acknowledged that victim input was “very 
influential” in decisions to grant or deny release.147  Another study found that 
for 90 percent of fifty-two board members in the United States and Canada, 
victim input had an impact on the release decision.148 
Lastly, the visceral and emotional intensity of victim testimony appears to 
influence board members toward denying release.  In California, a state that 
allows victim involvement but does not statutorily require boards to factor it 
into their release decision-making processes,149 board members believe 
victim testimony can subconsciously affect their decisions.150  One board 
member stated it was easy to become mired in a victim’s sadness at these 
hearings and that “[i]t does affect [them].”151  Another commented that 
anyone who says otherwise—that victim presence does not have a heavy 
emotional impact—is likely lying.152  One board member even stated that 
victim involvement likely explains high turnover rates for parole board 
members, as it is often so “emotional [and] gut wrenching.”153 
In reiterating that victims appear to exert great influence on the release 
process, one scholar, Julian V. Roberts, posits that victim participation exerts 
a greater influence on parole release decisions than sentencing decisions.154  
First, Roberts notes that the parole board has greater discretion than a 
sentencing judge.155  Second, Roberts argues victims mainly use their voice 
to seek parole denial, whereas in sentencing they have many other motives, 
such as compensation.156  And, third, Roberts posits that board members are 
more ill-suited to disregard prejudicial rather than probative information than 
a professional judge157 because they often have nonlegal credentials and are 
 
Simon Frasier University), summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems1/10276/etd2042.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7Z2-YSJ6]. 
 145. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750; see also Schwartzapfel, supra note 85. 
 147. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317. 
 148. Polowek, supra note 144, at 131–32 (finding that 13 assigned it “some influence,” 26 
assigned it “moderate influence,” and 4 assigned it “substantial influence”). 
 149. Young, supra note 97, at 478 n.274 (detailing that no mandate exists in California 
requiring board members to consider victim input in their release decisions).  But see, e.g., 
Making Parole Decisions, PA. PAROLE BD., https://www.parole.pa.gov/Parole%20Process/ 
Making%20Parole%20Decisions/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7H6N-TNF5] (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2021) (stating that Pennsylvania requires board members to factor victim 
input into their release decision by law). 
 150. See Young, supra note 97, at 472 & n.240. 
 151. Id. at 460 (emphasis in original). 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. at 461. 
 154. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 396–97. 
 155. See id. at 397. 
 156. See id. at 397–98. 
 157. Id. at 398. 
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political appointees, making them more sensitive to public support for victim 
rights.158 
There is deep controversy regarding the fact that victim input can so 
thoroughly influence the parole release decision.  Some scholars of parole 
have voiced deep skepticism regarding the propriety of victim influence over 
the release decision, arguing their input adds no relevant information for 
boards to consider when making release decisions.159  They argue that boards 
should focus solely on whether an inmate is sufficiently rehabilitated for 
release back into the community160 and that victim input almost never speaks 
to this issue.161 
In turn, board members have been receptive to these scholars’ arguments, 
as 61 percent of those surveyed believe the most important factor in their 
decision-making is an inmate’s likelihood of committing crimes upon 
conditional release.162  As discussed above, this approach would leave little 
room for victims to have a meaningful impact on the release calculus.  
Further, there are many board members who think victim input is an 
inappropriate factor to consider.163  In 1988, a survey found that 44 percent 
of responding board members agreed that victims provide valuable input, 
whereas 37 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that victims should even 
be permitted to give such input.164  It is important to note that while there are 
board members who push back against victim influence, victim input is 
regarded as highly important by an even larger proportion of board members 
today.  A comparative survey from 2015 found that eighteen out of thirty-one 
board members agreed or strongly agreed that victims offered valuable 
information on the release decision, while only two strongly disagreed and 
eleven expressed no opinion.165  Thus, while fewer board members disagree 
about the propriety of victim influence over parole release, there are varied 
approaches and inconsistencies among board members regarding how they 
view the value of victim input. 
These divergent approaches to victim testimony are further reflected by 
the fact that the same California board members who described the emotional 
toll of victim involvement on them166 almost unanimously stated that they 
“rarely put much weight into it”167 because it is not a determinant for 
suitability of release in their state.168  They stated that victims do not 
influence their decisions because the inquiry is about the inmate’s risk of 
recidivism, not the people whom the inmate hurt, and also “that not 
 
 158. See id.; see also Part I.B.1 (describing the general composition of parole boards). 
 159. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 386; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 318. 
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disregarding victims’ testimony would be unfair to the thousands of victims 
who chose not to—or could not—come to the hearing.”169 
That being said, the same board members uniformly support the 
unrestricted participation of victims170 because it confers a procedural and 
moral legitimacy on the hearings, keeps board members sensitive to victim 
interests, and can be therapeutic for victims.171  Board members’ support for 
victim participation, which they believe has no influence on their decision, 
could also be attributed to the fact that it appears fundamentally wrong not to 
allow victims to express their emotions when inmates who caused them such 
distress might be released back into society.172  Thus, in California the 
conundrum of uniformly supporting victim participation, while insisting they 
have no influence on the release decision, largely relegates victims to an 
expressive role that confers procedural integrity.173 
Nonetheless, victim input appears to exert a dramatic impact on release 
decisions in most jurisdictions.  Empirical studies not only uniformly show 
that victim input is a strong indicator of release denial but also that board 
members and inmates themselves view the input as quite influential and, at 
times, outcome-determinative.  Moreover, the emotionally charged nature of 
victim input makes it difficult for board members not to be influenced by 
it.174  However, the degree to which victim input is valued is inconsistent, as 
some jurisdictions and individual board members view victim influence on 
the release decision as improper175 and, in turn, may accord it different 
degrees of weight in their analyses.176  Yet, those very same board members 
often view victim participation at the hearing as indispensable to the integrity 
of the process, reflecting that even those who are skeptical believe there must 
be some role for victims in the release process.177 
Thus, it appears most parole boards believe victim input matters, yet there 
is no consensus on exactly how it matters.  The lack of clarity over the proper 
role of victims in the release process is addressed in Part II, which explains 
that the lack of clarity is a product of the fact that there are several approaches 
to understanding parole and the purposes it serves and that each approach 
treats victim input differently. 
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 174. See id. at 460–61. 
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II.  AN UNCERTAIN PURPOSE:  DISCRETIONARY RELEASE AND THE 
RELEVANCE OF VICTIM INPUT 
The days of victims playing a peripheral role in the parole process as 
passive witnesses are over.  Not only is their level of participation 
increasing,178 but as states proclaim how important victims’ voices are, an 
increasing number of parole boards are incorporating victim input into their 
release decisions.179  Currently, most states require their parole boards to 
“consider” or “evaluate” victim input when they make release decisions.180  
Such guidance leaves the parole board, an already nontransparent institution 
with broad discretion,181 in the position of deciding how victim testimony is 
relevant to the purposes of discretionary release.182  As a result, victim input 
is assessed inconsistently—at times with alarming results for inmates,183 but 
also for victims, who can be revictimized by unmet expectations.184  The 
status quo fosters a system in which victims serve an ambiguous purpose, as 
states fail to specify why they require boards to consider victim input.  This 
ambiguity prompts an even more important question:  what purposes should 
discretionary parole release serve more generally?  The answer to this 
question goes a long way to clarify how victim input may or may not be 
relevant to the release decision. 
Part II dissects the ambiguity surrounding the purpose of victim input in 
parole by identifying four frameworks, drawn from theory and practice, to 
understand parole release decisions.  It then examines how each framework 
accords varying degrees of importance to victim input.  The frameworks have 
certain explanatory power for what is happening in practice, a certain amount 
of theoretical persuasion, or some combination of both.  The frameworks are 
not mutually exclusive, as each approach blends factors applicable to all, 
except with different degrees of emphasis.  These four approaches and their 
corresponding treatment of victim input highlight the benefits and 
consequences of each approach, which helps to frame how victim input 
should be evaluated. 
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Part II.A presents the most theoretically persuasive understanding of 
discretionary parole release, which is that the release decision is primarily a 
judgment on an inmate’s rehabilitation.  Such an approach renders nearly all 
victim input irrelevant.185  However, given that parole boards do consider 
victim input, this theory lacks real explanatory power.  Part II.B presents a 
second understanding of parole release that, while an inmate must be 
rehabilitated, the decision is also a judgment on whether the ends of 
sentencing have been met, which makes victim input as relevant as it is at 
initial sentencing.  This theory, while perhaps more persuasive than the pure 
rehabilitation approach, still lacks real explanatory power because data 
shows that victim input exerts more influence on parole release than at 
sentencing.186  Part II.C then presents a third framework for understanding 
release in that it can also be a victim-centered decision, in which all victim 
input is given significant weight because it is important itself.  Then, a fourth 
framework examines how practice reveals that the significance of victim 
input may very well depend on whether a victim is sympathetic or not.  Thus, 
Part II.D posits that, in addition to rehabilitation, sentencing goals, and victim 
preference, board members consider public sentiment when making 
decisions, as release is inherently a politically accountable decision.  In this 
framework, victim input is relevant to the extent the victims are sympathetic 
in the public’s eye. 
A.  Rehabilitation as the Key Determinant for Discretionary Release 
The most common theoretical understanding of discretionary parole 
release is that its fundamental purpose is to determine if rehabilitation has 
been attained and to reward that achievement with release.187  In turn, parole 
boards, in making release decisions, are concerned with “two principal 
questions:  does the prisoner represent a significant risk to the community, 
and will his release on conditions promote his rehabilitation?”188  Parole 
boards have a narrow mandate because, as Roberts articulates, “[f]rom 
sentencing to parole, the justice system changes from one concerned with 
retribution to one preoccupied primarily with risk and the rehabilitation of 
the offender.”189 
The idea is that, in an indeterminate sentencing regime, the parole board 
should be bound by the sentencing judge’s determination that the minimum 
sentence is long enough to meet those ends of punishment exclusive of 
rehabilitation, such as retribution and deterrence.190  Under this framework, 
the parole board should not deny release based on the belief that a longer 
sentence is necessary on retributive grounds, but boards must instead focus 
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exclusively on evidence germane to an inmate’s ability to lead a crime-free 
life if released.191  In other words, “[t]he inmate, not the crime, is at the center 
of the inquiry,” as the determination is to what degree the inmate is 
rehabilitated.192 
This way of understanding parole is frequently reflected in statements 
from parole boards, such as California’s Board of Parole Hearings, which 
states that the “purpose of a parole suitability hearing is to determine whether 
an inmate currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 
released from prison.”193  In Virginia, the parole board website states, “The 
Board’s mission is to grant parole or conditional release to those inmates 
whose release is compatible with public safety.”194  In Ohio, the mission 
statement is simple:  “Reduce Recidivism Among Those We Touch.”195  
Following the logic that rehabilitation is the key determinant for release, it 
would appear victim input is almost never relevant, and therefore 
insignificant, because it rarely, if ever, speaks to that concern.196  The rare 
instance when victims might have pertinent information relevant to an 
inmate’s rehabilitation is if, for example, they can demonstrate the inmate 
has sent threatening letters to victims or otherwise engaged with them in 
disturbing or inappropriate ways post-sentencing.197 
However, since most boards encourage victims to discuss whatever they 
think is relevant,198 victims almost exclusively and principally advocate for 
denial of parole and detail their continued suffering from the crime—
information that is not germane to assessing the risk of recidivism.199  This 
common type of victim testimony does not speak to the risk of reoffense an 
inmate poses; as such, it would appear improper for boards to consider it as 
a rationale for denying release under this framework.200 
The result of this logic is similar to the reality detailed at California Board 
of Parole hearings, in which victims participate in hearings and are told their 
voice is important but, in reality, their input has no bearing on the release 
decision.201  Thus, victims—if parole is understood as primarily concerned 
with rehabilitation—are relegated to a purely expressive role, where their 
voice has no impact on release (as opposed to an instrumental one, where it 
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does).202  Relegating victim input to an expressive role is based on the idea 
that sharing one’s experience in a public setting can be cathartic and even 
therapeutic for victims and inmates.203  However, not every parole hearing is 
public, and victim input is often treated confidentially.204  This begs the 
question:  just how therapeutic is it for victims to relive a terrible experience 
with a panel of board members they have never met before?  Moreover, if 
victims are assigned a purely expressive role at hearings, it would appear 
victims are being deceived about the actual significance of their input given 
victims are often assured that their opinion matters.205  This discrepancy 
between messaging and reality can lead to further victimization because 
victims suffer as a result of unmet expectations.206 
While this approach is theoretically persuasive and in line with parole’s 
conception, it fails to explain how decisions are made in practice because 
victims are in many instances quite influential.207  If it really is all about 
rehabilitation, victim input would be given no weight whatsoever and likely 
would not be involved in the first place.  This leads one to wonder:  Are 
boards routinely considering and acting on impermissible criteria when they 
consider victim input?  Or, is rehabilitation not the key determinant for parole 
since release decisions are also a judgment of other important considerations? 
B.  Discretionary Release as a Resentencing Scheme 
If parole boards in an indeterminate sentencing system are supposed to 
work hand-in-hand with the sentencing judge to define an inmate’s true 
period of incarceration,208 discretionary release can also be understood as a 
quasi-judicial assessment of whether the ends of sentencing have been met.  
Such an assessment not only requires, at a minimum, that the inmate is 
rehabilitated but also embraces criminal punishment’s other ends:  retribution 
and deterrence.209  Retribution is the sentencing principle that “offenders 
should be punished in proportion to their blameworthiness,” as defined “by 
the nature and seriousness of the harm caused,” and their culpability.210  This 
can serve as both a justification for and against punishment, as people should 
not be punished any more or less than they deserve.211  Specific deterrence 
is the sentencing principle that seeks to discourage the defendant from 
reoffending by instilling fear of receiving a similar penalty in the future.212  
General deterrence is the principle that, by instilling a fear of receiving a 
 
 202. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 384. 
 204. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29. 
 205. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 206. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 208. See Slater, supra note 35. 
 209. See Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’ 
Perspective, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2291 (2020); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL 1–2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 210. Richard S. Frase, Purpose:  Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005). 
 211. See id. at 73–74. 
 212. See id. at 70. 
2021] AN UNCERTAIN PARTICIPANT 813 
comparable sentence, an inmate’s period of incarceration must be sufficiently 
long to discourage other would-be offenders from committing crimes.213 
Understanding parole decisions as incorporating these elements of 
sentencing, parole boards might be seen as well-situated to implement the 
ideals of retribution and deterrence, as they potentially operate with more 
knowledge of the inmate and the nature of the inmate’s crime than the 
sentencing court did.214  The board has access to the inmate’s behavior 
posttrial215 and potentially relevant information from a victim concerning the 
impact of the crime.216  For example, if the parole board believes the 
sentencing judge was too lenient and underestimated the long-term 
consequences of the crime, the parole board could deny release to reflect a 
fairer sentence, even if an inmate poses little risk of reoffense.217  In essence, 
this approach embraces the idea that board members are able to put 
themselves in the shoes of the sentencing judge and divine what the judge’s 
decision would be if the judge had access to the information the board 
members had. 
Such an approach, however, is controversial because it may violate a 
judge’s intentions about the sentence and the judge’s assumptions about the 
board’s role.218  If a sentencing judge expects the parole board to engage in 
retrospective sentencing when it has more information, there appears to be 
no issue.  However, if the sentencing judge believes release is presumed once 
the inmate poses no crime risk, there can be real tension as the board could 
violate the sentencing judge’s expectations of the proper sentence.219  Some 
have even argued that permitting the board to entertain sentencing principles 
is wrong, as it condones an administrative act performing a responsibility 
properly entrusted to the judiciary.220 
Further, there are concerns regarding the propriety of such a resentencing 
scheme because, as an initial matter, board members are not judges, are often 
less qualified, and have less legal experience.221  This might very well lead 
to more parole denials based on deterrent or retributive motives, because 
approaches to these principles can vary widely.222  Lastly, some critics have 
argued that if the sentencing decision is poor, the proper remedy lies not with 
the parole board but with better sentencing procedures.223 
It appears, though, that many states embrace something akin to this 
approach for their parole system, as demonstrated by their assigning parole 
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boards the task of ensuring that release decisions are compatible with the 
welfare of society and do not undermine the seriousness of the crime 
committed.224  Indeed, board members nearly unanimously state that the 
nature and severity of the underlying crime is a key factor in their release 
calculus.225  In Virginia, for example, an appropriate reason for denial is the 
nature of the crime, as defined by “the harm committed or caused to others, 
the magnitude of the crime, and its impact on the victim and community.”226  
Such a mandate seems to channel sentencing principles into parole 
decision-making, as these considerations—nature and impact of the crime—
shed little light on the risk of reoffense. 
The relevance and significance of victim input under this approach to 
parole is similar to the relevance of victim input at sentencing.227  It is 
important to note, though, that victims seldom influence sentencing 
decisions, as judges are adept at ignoring evidence with no probative value, 
such as a victim’s appeal for a more severe sentence.228  However, in the 
parole context, victim input does matter to the extent that it sheds light on the 
true long-term consequences of the crime and its corresponding severity; 
those issues affect the degree to which retribution and deterrence are 
necessary.  How victim input influences the calculus depends on one’s 
approach to meeting requisite retribution and deterrence.229  If the parole 
board thinks the sentencing judge misinterpreted the true degree of the 
victim’s suffering—and thus the severity of the crime—members can deny 
parole to reflect the fact that the minimum sentence did not achieve 
retribution proportionate to the impact of the underlying crime.230  Further, 
if a victim forgives an inmate or argues hardship might result from longer 
incarceration because it prevents the offender from securing work to pay 
restitution,231 such information would be relevant.  This information points 
toward release because it would reveal that the need for retribution on the 
victim’s part has been achieved.232 
Lastly, victims are typically not solicited for their opinions about how a 
particular sentence will impact them,233 though some U.S. jurisdictions do 
permit sentence recommendations from victims.234  Thus, if one understands 
parole as a resentencing scheme, victim testimony is only relevant to the 
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extent it provides information regarding the crime’s actual impact.  As 
frustrating as it may be for victims, their desire for parole denial with nothing 
else linking that desire to sentencing’s goals would not be considered by the 
board because it would be considered irrelevant in this scheme. 
While this framework possesses certain theoretical persuasiveness, the 
inquiry does not end here.  This framework fails to fully explain how parole 
boards make decisions in practice because victim input is not only considered 
for its probative value regarding proper sentencing.  Instead, several parole 
boards directly solicit victims’ personal opinions about how parole release 
might impact them and whether they support release.235  Thus, one must dig 
further and infer a third approach that has more explanatory power—an 
approach that assigns great value and significance to victim input because it 
should, itself, be considered important.236 
C.  Discretionary Release as a Victim-Centric Decision 
Discretionary release decisions can also be understood as placing a high 
value on victim input because board members, like much of the public, are 
supportive of a criminal justice system that is responsive to and concerned 
with victims’ unique needs.  As the victim rights movement mobilized for 
increased victim involvement in the criminal justice system,237 many parole 
boards responded with well-intentioned efforts to encourage victim 
participation and ensure victims that their voices mattered.238  Today, many 
parole boards convey that victims are important and at the “heart” of the 
release decision.239  This messaging reflects what appears to occur in practice 
because victim participation is a significant predictor of parole denial in 
many jurisdictions.240  While the old parole system may have detrimentally 
excluded victims, some argue the modern system, by allowing victims to play 
an instrumental role,241 may better help victims shed feelings of helplessness 
during their offenders’ criminal proceedings.242  Under this approach, victim 
input can legitimately exert direct influence on the release decision. 
If one believes release should be attuned to victims’ interests, victim input 
is significant and relevant regardless of what it conveys.  Thus, even if a 
board finds that an individual is rehabilitated and that the sentencing 
principles of retribution and deterrence met, a board member may still deny 
parole based on the victim’s needs and preferences.  In Alabama, for 
example, inmates are almost never granted release over a victim’s 
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objection.243  In New York, the parole board on some occasions has rescinded 
parole, weeks after granting it, after victims expressed disapproval of not 
being given an opportunity to be heard at the original hearing.244  The courts 
have upheld such rescissions, so long as the victim input offered was 
“significant” and “not known” by the board at the time release was 
granted.245  In those cases, victim testimony concerned victims’ lingering 
suffering.246  Although the law of parole rescission is not relevant to this 
Note, such cases demonstrate that parole boards can effectively give victims 
veto power, even if the parole board determined that release was acceptable 
according to other criteria.  However, in one case, with a familiar fact 
pattern—release followed by victims protesting that they did not have an 
opportunity to be heard at the hearing247—the New York Court of Appeals 
reversed a parole rescission and ordered release but was careful to note that 
the case “should not be interpreted as minimizing . . . the importance of 
victim impact statements in parole board hearings.”248 
Lastly, under this approach, it would appear that all victim input must be 
treated equally, irrespective of whether the victim is sympathetic or able to 
appear at a hearing, because not doing so would offend notions of equality 
and fairness.249  Input from the family of a murdered gang member must be 
accorded the same significance as input from the family of a murdered police 
officer.250  Moreover, victims who are unable to attend a hearing—due to 
illness or inability to travel or because the crime’s impact was so physically 
or psychologically devastating that they are unable or unwilling to relive the 
experience—must be afforded the same care and attention in the release 
decision as those who can attend hearings.  Otherwise, there is a possibility 
that an inmate, who would have been denied release had a victim appeared, 
could be released because a victim could not be present.  This would result 
in the unequal treatment of victims. 
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However, it appears that the influence of victim input often depends on 
whether victims appear at a hearing,251 give oral as opposed to written 
testimony,252 or are sympathetic in the public’s eyes.253  This illustrates that 
parole has perhaps strayed from the victim rights movement’s goal of equally 
supporting all victims.  The acknowledgment that victim impact can be 
relative and may not be given consistent weight presents a fourth way to 
understand parole release decisions—that release could be driven, in many 
instances, by political considerations since parole boards are accountable to 
the public. 
D.  Discretionary Release as a Political Decision 
Release decisions can also be understood as political decisions that reflect 
public sentiment.  In fact, discretionary parole release has been described as 
“in most instances, a political decision [because] parole board members are 
typically political appointees sensitive to the emotional utterances of 
victims”254 and to larger societal pressures.255  The fact that parole release is 
attuned to public sentiment makes sense because members enjoy low 
professional status, high job insecurity, and are offered little insulation from 
public reprisals.256  Further, surveys have found that board members rate 
political vulnerability and the pressure to minimize risk as their greatest 
concerns257 because they are often held accountable for a single decision that 
goes wrong, while hundreds of correct ones are glossed over.258  In general, 
parole boards face grave political exposure when they take controversial 
pro-release stances in closely watched cases, which often involve murdered 
law enforcement officers, sympathetic victims, or particularly gruesome 
crimes.259  Therefore, in these cases, the guiding principle is not 
 
 251. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 355–57. 
 252. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 253. Many controversial board decisions often concern releasing inmates convicted of 
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scrutiny. See Baker, supra note 8; see also Mike Bergazzi & Jon Burkett, Virginia Inspector 
General Reviewing Controversial Parole Decision of Man Who Murdered Richmond Cop, 
CBS 6 NEWS RICHMOND (May 8, 2020, 11:54 PM), https://www.wtvr.com/news/local-
news/virginia-watchdog-reviewing-controversial-parole-decision-of-man-who-murdered-cop 
[https://perma.cc/K8V6-CNSR]. 
 254. James W. Marquart, Bringing Victims In, But How Far, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
329, 330 (2005). 
 255. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85. 
 256. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2748–49. 
 257. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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 259. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (“‘You generally don’t get reappointed if you take 
a controversial stand on a media case.  And most cases involving law enforcement personnel 
become media cases,’ said Thomas Grant, a former member of the New York parole board.”). 
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rehabilitation, sentencing, or even being pro-victim but instead the 
fulfillment of the public’s preferences. 
This idea recently played out following the outcry over Herman Bell’s 
release.  Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, who was also convicted for the murder of 
Officers Piagentini and Jones, was denied release in 2018, with the Board 
declaring, “There is considerable community opposition to your release.”260  
Professor Steven Zeidman speculated that the public outcry led the board to 
deny release for Muntaqim.261  Interestingly, in New York, community 
members’ input is not listed as a statutory factor that the board is directed to 
consider under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).262  Yet, courts in New York 
have routinely held that the Board may consider input from individuals other 
than those identified in the statute.263  For example, in Applewhite v. New 
York State Board of Parole,264 the court rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that the Board’s “consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community 
opposition’ to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant 
statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release 
determination.”265  The court argued that community members’ opinions 
could be considered by the Board even though they are not listed as factors 
in the relevant statute because a separate portion of the statute—
§ 259-i(2)(c)(B)—protects the confidentiality of community members who 
submit written input concerning an inmate’s potential release.266  The court 
held that, by including this confidentiality provision, “the Legislature 
demonstrated a clear intent that such opinions [from community members] 
are a factor that may be considered by [the Board] in rendering its ultimate 
parole release decision.”267 
Such an approach to release can be defended on the grounds that the public 
may hold certain wisdom regarding proper punishment.  Perhaps community 
members’ input should be considered for tough questions, such as whether 
those convicted of murdering police officers should even be eligible for 
parole.268  However, Professor Zeidman argued that board members should 
not be influenced by the public, as such an approach turns the release decision 
into a “popularity contest.”269 
 
 260. Gross, supra note 7. 
 261. See id. (discussing Professor Zeidman’s understanding of how the release process 
played out in this instance). 
 262. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021). 
 263. See, e.g., Jones v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652. (N.Y. App. Div. 
2019) (finding that “letters in support and in opposition to [the inmate’s] release” are relevant 
factors to consider); Clark v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 531–32 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2018) (holding that “the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole 
application submitted by public officials and members of the community”). 
 264. 167 A.D.3d 1380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019). 
 265. Id. at 1381. 
 266. Id. at 1381–82. 
 267. Id. at 1382. 
 268. See Letter from Bill De Blasio, supra note 17. 
 269. Gross, supra note 7. 
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“Popularity contest” may be an apt description for how victims fit into this 
way of understanding parole release, as boards would decide which victims 
are more deserving of influence based on their ability to garner the public’s 
sympathy.  In other words, the relevance of victim input strictly correlates 
with the alignment of victims’ interests with the public’s.  It is often the case 
that these interests align, as victim rights groups have been successful in 
capturing the public’s sympathy.270  This symbiotic relationship has resulted 
in enormous pressure on boards to adopt a cautious disposition toward release 
since victims and the public are broadly opposed to release.271 
Conversely, victim input can be ignored entirely if victims cannot marshal 
sufficient public sympathy for their cases.  It may be easier for the family of 
a slain police officer to gain public support and exert pressure on a board than 
it may be for an unsympathetic victim to do the same.272 
As Part II illustrates, there may be great discrepancies among board 
members in how they approach the parole release decision and treat victim 
input.273  This has resulted in a muddled mess in which victim input occupies 
an ambiguous position and can be treated inconsistently among board 
members depending on the framework board members adopt.  Accordingly, 
Part III recommends a solution to define the proper approach to the release 
decision and victim input.  Further, it recommends a more holistic approach 
to the parole process so that it can work better for victims, inmates, and board 
members. 
III.  PIERCING THE FOG:  GUIDANCE FOR THE TREATMENT OF VICTIM INPUT 
The Herman Bell case highlights the many unanswered questions 
concerning how release decisions should be made and what victims’ role 
should be.  Rather than resolving these pressing questions, the current system 
gives parole boards great discretion in their approach to victim input.274  To 
make sense of this situation, this Note identified four approaches to 
discretionary release to demonstrate the ways parole boards evaluate victim 
 
 270. See supra Part I.C. 
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input.275  These approaches show the dramatically different options at board 
members’ disposal, which, if left unguided, could lead to unmet expectations 
and inconsistent decision-making.  Left to their own devices, board members 
might allow victim input to dominate the process, thus potentially resulting 
in a higher denial rate.276 
Accordingly, clarifying the approach parole boards should employ 
requires balancing the benefits and consequences of involving victims.  
Opening the doors of hearings to victims has had adverse consequences, 
including putting board members in the untenable position of deciding how 
to incorporate victims’ input and thus creating public distrust in the 
process.277  Also, victim influence has unmoored parole from its roots as a 
gauge of an inmate’s rehabilitation, leading to denials for otherwise 
rehabilitated inmates and frustrating a core principle of indeterminate 
sentencing—incentivizing rehabilitation.278  This situation has elicited 
criticism, and there are many calls for excluding victims or limiting their 
role.279  However, permitting victims to participate has positive outcomes:  
victims can be genuinely heard, have their legitimate interests addressed, and 
have their pain at least acknowledged, thus fueling greater trust in the 
criminal justice system.280  Moreover, to bar victims completely from the 
process or deny them any influence is wrong,281 as it has adverse 
consequences of its own, such as secondary harm for victims who believe the 
state has ignored them282 or, worse, has falsely promised them more 
influence than they actually have.283  Striking a balance between no victim 
participation and significant victim influence is critical for the future of a 
well-functioning parole system.  The proper purposes of the release decision 
should be clarified, not left to the whims of an individual board member. 
To this end, Part III recommends that discretionary parole release should 
be treated both as a gauge of rehabilitation and as a resentencing scheme.  
Accordingly, victim input should only influence the release decision if it 
provides information, not emotion, showing either that the inmate is not 
rehabilitated or that the judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect 
the impact of the crime and thus did not meet punishment’s retributive and 
deterrent goals.  If a victim’s testimony reveals, in the eyes of the parole 
board, that either rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution are not met, the 
input should legitimately influence the release decision.  That being said, 
victims should be allowed to participate freely in the release process even 
though their influence on the actual release decision is curtailed in the ways 
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described above.  Part III.A presents the rationale for treating the release 
decision as a resentencing of sorts that gauges rehabilitation and the goals of 
sentencing and the corresponding treatment of victim input such an approach 
signals.  Part III.B considers the implications of this recommendation and the 
procedural changes required for its implementation in a consistent, fair 
manner that does not trample the legitimate interests and expectations of 
victims and inmates.  Part III.C argues that, considering this Note’s proposed 
solution, care must be exercised to avoid causing victims secondary harm, 
and parole boards should think beyond the release-deny dichotomy as a 
means for securing justice and ensuring healing for victims. 
A.  Information, Not Emotion:  Limiting Victim Influence on Discretionary 
Release 
This Note proposes that parole boards should treat the release decision as 
a gauge of rehabilitation and the goals of sentencing.  Only information 
offered by the victim that is pertinent to the question of an inmate’s 
rehabilitation or the extent to which sentencing goals have been met should 
influence the decision.  This approach to discretionary release can lead to 
more just, consistent, and impartial considerations of victim input than the 
alternative approaches of treating the release decision as either a 
victim-centered one or as one sensitive to the public’s needs.284  In addition, 
this approach can better reap the rewards of a properly functioning 
indeterminate sentencing scheme—fewer costs, less crowded prisons, and a 
prison populace with a strong incentive to behave and reform.285 
First, this Note embraces this more limited approach to victim influence 
because granting or denying parole should be treated as a quasi-judicial act 
based on law and fact.286  This profoundly important decision determines 
how much longer an individual serves behind bars and should reflect the 
same careful and impartial analysis required of a judge during sentencing.287  
Board members must determine whether an inmate is sufficiently 
rehabilitated to lead a crime-free life and should also consider victim input 
regarding the impact of the crime, as society has an interest in enforcing 
punishment proportional to the harm caused.288  If the parole board thinks 
the sentencing judge misinterpreted the true degree of the victim’s 
suffering—and collaterally the severity of the crime—it can deny parole to 
reflect the fact that the minimum sentence did not achieve retribution 
proportionate to the crime’s impact.289  Of course, permitting board members 
to consider sentencing principles poses risks of its own.290 
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Second, victim influence on the release decision should be limited because 
the criminal justice system should not necessarily be governed by the 
victims’ needs.  Just as a judge is generally adept at ignoring “extralegal” 
material, like a victim’s opinion on punishment, and instead solicits 
information about the crime’s impact to fashion a proper sentence,291 so too 
should the board consider only information regarding an inmate’s risk of 
recidivism and the true impact of the crime.  Board members should not 
consider the victim’s emotionally driven preference for a certain type of 
punishment.  While such an approach may appear callous to victims and 
further sideline them in a criminal justice system that has historically and 
wrongfully ignored victims,292 the fact remains that considering a victim’s 
emotional desire for greater severity, or perhaps leniency, is inappropriate in 
the parole release context.  As Professor Susan Bandes rightly points out, it 
is important not to equate the question of what victims need with the question 
of what the legal system ought to provide.293  Victims’ interests need not 
account for the wrongdoer’s rights and society’s interests; on the other hand, 
the legal system must adequately account for fairness and due process, in 
light of the high stakes and troubling but real possibility of error.294 
The other approaches are simply inappropriate for parole.  The approach 
that posits that parole release could be understood as a victim-centric 
decision295 and the approach that posits that victim preferences for parole 
should be significant so long as they are sympathetic with the public296 are 
inappropriate because they create a web of fairness concerns.  In addition, 
they frustrate the goals of establishing an indeterminate sentencing system in 
the first place; these goals include:  (1) reducing the financial costs of 
incarceration, (2) addressing overcrowding in prisons, and (3) providing a 
strong incentive for inmates to follow prison rules and achieve 
rehabilitation.297 
As many studies have shown, victim input can be afforded significant 
weight if board members are left to evaluate it at their own discretion;298 yet, 
only 10 percent of victims appear at hearings, raising concerns of unequal 
treatment for similarly situated inmates.299  Similarly, it raises concerns of 
unequal treatment of victims in that only victims who have the means to 
attend hearings can have their preferences considered by board members, 
whereas those who cannot, through no fault of their own, are ignored.300  The 
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idea that release decisions—and thus the criminal justice system’s evaluation 
of the importance of a victim’s suffering—can turn on a victim’s ability to 
attend a hearing or timely submit an impact statement seems arbitrary 
because it will lead to unjustifiable discrepancies, a result that is unfair to 
inmates.301  Given these troubling realities, the release decision should 
instead be guided by a holistic analysis of inmates’ behavior and the impact 
of their crimes. 
Further, affording victim input significant weight can frustrate the 
rationale of establishing an indeterminate sentencing system.  This approach 
often results in release denials for otherwise rehabilitated inmates because of 
a victim’s compelling testimony.302  Additionally, permitting board members 
to significantly consider victim input can discourage inmates from involving 
themselves in the parole process.  Studies show inmates postpone or even 
waive their own parole hearings altogether when they learn a victim will 
attend because they fear that the hearing will be a “fait accompli.”303  Thus, 
rather than working out their own salvation as indeterminate sentencing 
imagined,304 inmates instead can be easily disillusioned with the process 
when the extent of victim influence is not properly cabined. 
Finally, the approach that posits that victim input can be treated as more 
or less influential based on the public’s sympathy for a particular victim305 
poses equally disturbing complications.  As Professor Zeidman rightly puts 
it, such an approach transforms the parole system into a popularity contest.306  
Moreover, it is unsustainable to approach parole release in such a manner, as 
it would discriminate among victims, further harming victims already 
alienated by the public’s failure to see their suffering as legitimate.307  
Allowing the public’s preference for the victim’s personal interests to be a 
legitimate consideration for boards is no way to sustainably run a fair and 
impartial parole system. 
While the criminal justice system should be more accommodating to 
victims, the parole hearing is one place where the law should not determine 
outcomes based on the victim’s preference.  Board members—who preside 
over a powerful instrument of the justice system—must remain cognizant of 
inmates’ rights and should make decisions based on the best information 
available, not necessarily the very real and legitimate emotionally driven 
needs of victims.  Society has an interest in ensuring that proper, not 
disproportionate, punishment is meted out.  Therefore, victims should have 
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limited influence on the release decision, and their input should only affect 
the decision if the information they provide addresses issues of rehabilitation 
or proper punishment. 
However, permitting board members to second-guess a judge’s sentence 
and cabining victim influence is not without controversy.  It will require 
adaptation.  There must be procedural and structural changes to parole release 
to put this approach into effect in a fair and consistent manner. 
B.  The Procedural Implications of Defining Victim Influence 
Regardless of how one thinks victim input should be evaluated, there is 
one procedural change all can agree with:  states must codify the purposes of 
parole release so relevant parties can understand beforehand how victim 
input will be evaluated.  This section presents the procedural implications of 
limiting victim influence according to this Note’s resolution. 
1.  States Must Codify the Purposes of Parole Release 
As a threshold matter, even if one disagrees with the position that parole 
boards should permit victim input to influence the release decision in limited 
circumstances, the fact remains that board discretion must be channeled in 
some articulable way so that the board’s treatment of victims meets a 
legitimate purpose.  Whichever approach to victim input is adopted,308 there 
must be regulation or legislation clearly articulating that standard.  A factor, 
like victim input, should serve a predetermined purpose, and the decision 
about how to incorporate that factor should not be left to board members, as 
practice reveals their approaches can vary considerably.309  If board members 
are not provided guidance beforehand, they will continue to apply disparate 
standards.  It will be too easy for them to overvalue victim input because they 
may be quite empathetic toward emotionally charged victim testimony.310  
Alternatively, board members might improperly undervalue victim input if 
they personally think victims should have no say.311  Accordingly, even if 
there is disagreement about the level of influence victims should have, all 
should agree that, at a minimum, state legislatures must codify which 
approach or theory of parole release governs.  Parole boards must be 
transparent regarding the approach they apply so that all can understand the 
extent to which victim input will factor into the board’s decision.  Not doing 
so can expose victims to secondary harm through unmet expectations312 and 
cause inmates to question the legitimacy of the process,313 diminishing both 
groups’ trust in the criminal justice system.  If states allow victim input to 
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influence decisions only when it relates to rehabilitation or the goals of 
sentencing, there are additional procedural implications that the states must 
take into account.  These are addressed below. 
2.  Procedural Implications of Limiting Victim Influence 
Changes to the parole release process must be enacted if a state wants to 
ensure that victim input is applied in a manner consistent with this Note’s 
recommendation.  First, states must require higher qualifications for board 
members and afford them greater protections from public or political reprisal 
to ensure they are sufficiently capable of performing their quasi-judicial task.  
Second, board members must justify their release decisions through reasoned 
analysis, much like judges.  Third, there must be a real opportunity for 
judicial review of these decisions to ensure due process is met.  Without these 
procedural changes, parole boards’ natural tendency toward caution could 
lead to a crush of denials based on deterrent or retributive motivations.314 
First, the qualifications required of board members are insufficient given 
the complex nature of the work board members perform.315  Coinciding with 
this lack of requisite expertise and credentials, board members suffer from 
political vulnerability and can be removed easily.316  Thus, if board members 
are expected to evaluate rehabilitation and the satisfaction of sentencing 
goals, they must have expertise similar to that of a judge and must be 
insulated from nonstatutory considerations such as political, public, or other 
pressures.  If one allows board members to second-guess a sentencing judge’s 
minimum sentence, such second-guessing must come from a similarly adept 
and independent decision-maker.317  Thus, qualifications must be similar to 
those required for judges.  To insulate board members from improper 
pressures, some states use a nonpartisan panel of individuals with law 
enforcement and criminal defense backgrounds to recommend appointments 
and work with the governor to nominate board members.318  Another option 
is to use for board members the same process used for the selection and 
removal of judges.319 
Second, states must require board members to be forthcoming in their 
rationales.  One-line explanations, or even no explanations at all, for release 
decisions is inadequate,320 especially if a board member is denying release 
 
 314. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (documenting many cases where parole boards are 
overly cautious and deny release to individuals who pose little risk of recidivism). 
 315. See supra Part I.B; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286. 
 316. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 (likening parole boards to “sitting ducks” when a 
decision goes wrong). 
 317. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 280 (“[P]rison release decision[s] should be 
approached with the same care and consideration given judicial sentencing.”). 
 318. See id. at 288–89.  Hawaii, for example, relies on nominations forwarded by a panel 
comprised of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the president of the Hawaii 
Criminal Justice Association, and the president of the Bar Association of Hawaii, among other 
similarly capable nominators. Id.  Utah draws its nominees from its Commission on Criminal 
and Juvenile Justice. Id. 
 319. See id. at 289. 
 320. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
826 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
based on what the board member believes was an incorrect minimum 
sentence.  It is more difficult for board members to be arbitrary and 
inconsistent in their rulings if they must defend their decisions with facts and 
evidence.  Thus, board members, if permitted to entertain principles of 
sentencing must transparently explain how the victim input was not available 
to the sentencing judge or was improperly overlooked at sentencing, such 
that the true severity of the crime was miscalculated.  Investment is required 
to enable board members to engage in such thorough decision-making if it is 
to be comparable to a sentencing decision.321  Currently, there are too few 
board members, and decisions are often made in mere minutes, which shows 
just how rushed they can be.322  Thus, states must hire more parole board 
members to allow for such a reasoned decision-making process.  With 
committed resources, this approach can prevent board members from being 
overly focused on retribution or deterrence, as their opinions will have to 
show that the sentencing judge made a mistake—a serious claim to make. 
In addition to counteracting a board that might overvalue deterrent or 
retributive principles, requiring a judicial-like opinion for release decisions 
can also better protect board members from negative public reaction and 
reduce feelings of disillusionment among victims323 and inmates324 when a 
decision goes against their wishes.  Requiring board members to publicly 
explain how their decisions comport with the letter of the law, while not a 
panacea for those who disagree with the decision, will at least show that these 
decisions are not arbitrary or inherently unfair and can promote better 
understanding among the affected parties.  Currently, the black box nature of 
parole does not offer board members any protection, as the public may 
struggle to have faith in an institution which can be nontransparent.325  
Requiring thorough opinions can counteract negative perceptions of 
discretionary release. 
Third, parole board decisions must be subjected to legitimate appeal and 
review in the state court system; such an appeal process is currently not 
available in some states.326  This reform requires written board opinions, as 
well as transcripts of proceedings, to be maintained, as meaningful review of 
release decisions is hindered by the absence of these key records.327  Thus, 
having written opinions and transcripts available can subject decisions to 
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more meaningful appellate review.328  This can then provide a check on 
board members to ensure they are following the statutory criteria and 
producing sufficiently transparent and consistent release decisions. 
While this Note recommends limited victim influence on the release 
decision and advocates for procedural changes that would allow parole 
decisions to better attain that goal, there must also be procedural changes that 
safeguard victims from further harm and allow their interests to be heard. 
C.  Assuring Procedural Justice for Victims 
While it is important for the parole release process to be fair and impartial 
for all parties, it is equally, if not more, important that the release process 
treats victims and their interests with care and does everything possible to 
avoid causing them secondary harms.329  While this Note proposes an 
approach to parole release that would limit the extent victims can influence 
the actual release decision, it nonetheless advocates for a process that is 
attuned to victims’ needs and argues that parole boards should move beyond 
the release-deny dichotomy as a means to aid victims in their healing. 
First, the discretionary release process itself must be fair to victims if board 
members are going to ask for their participation.  States should incorporate 
principles of procedural justice when they tailor their processes so as to 
reduce the potential for secondary harms to victims.330  According to 
proponents of procedural justice, victims can be satisfied with a criminal 
justice process, like parole release, even if they do not agree with the 
outcome, so long as they believe that the parole release process is fair.331  To 
develop a trustworthy process, victims should be allowed to discuss what is 
important to them with the parole boards; however, the parole board must 
display its neutrality and be honest with the victim regarding the way they 
will factor the victim’s input into the release decision.332  Further, parole 
boards must afford victims dignity and respect, rather than deceiving them 
about the functioning of the process.333 
As a result, states should reflect the true relevance of victim input on the 
release decision in their public messaging and in their guidelines.  Implying 
victim input lies at the heart of the decision process—when it may or may 
not be334 or only does 10 percent of the time335—deceives victims about the 
actual treatment of their input.336  Such an approach cultivates secondary 
harm if a release decision goes against the victims’ wishes.  For example, if 
this Note’s recommendations were applied to Herman Bell’s case, perhaps 
Diane Piagentini, while almost certainly still disagreeing with the outcome, 
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might have been less harmed by the decision, had the Board been 
forthcoming about the weight her input would be afforded.  Instead, the 
Board cited the testimony of what was likely some members of Officer Jones’ 
family337 as compelling and neglected to mention Diane Piagentini at all.338  
It is not hard to see how she might view this outcome as unfair and as an act 
of secondary victimization, as it may have rightly appeared to her that the 
New York Board of Parole chose to value another victim’s preference over 
hers with no explanation. 
While parole boards should be truthful with victims regarding the weight 
and role of their input, parole boards should also permit unrestrained access 
to the hearings if a victim so desires.  Rather than provide victims an 
instrumental role, parole boards should be clear with victims that their role 
at hearings is entirely expressive unless the information they provide speaks 
to an inmate’s rehabilitation or shows that the sentencing minimum did not 
accomplish certain sentencing goals.  Though affording this transparency 
might be uncomfortable, a victim’s expectations will at least not be 
manipulated even if their role is smaller than they would have wished; as 
scholar Kathryne Young notes, “honesty and legitimacy go hand in hand.”339  
Further, if boards only permit victim input to have a limited influence, parole 
boards should discuss the benefits and drawbacks of reliving the experience 
in a public setting with a victim beforehand.340  Additionally, to better realize 
the therapeutic and cathartic potential inherent in victim expression, parole 
boards should improve hearings for the victims that choose to attend.341  
Parole boards should consider offering mental health support for victims who 
make the decision to submit testimony concerning what could be one of the 
most haunting and significant moments of their lives.342  In the same vein, 
hearing times should be longer than twenty-minute conveyor-belt-like 
sessions.343 
Finally, parole boards should abandon the notion that a victim’s needs or 
interests can or should be satisfied only by granting or denying parole.  Parole 
boards should not link caring for victims with denying parole, as that is 
simply unsustainable for the health of both the system and the victim.  It may 
prevent healing for victims because they focus on protesting at parole 
hearings and have a deep emotional attachment to getting denial for their 
offenders, instead of “moving on” with their lives.344  Moreover, it is 
unsustainable because an inmate may still be released, causing real anguish 
for the victim who has so much emotionally invested in the outcome.  Instead, 
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board members should care about how victims will feel about release—not 
for purposes of deciding whether release is just, but for purposes of 
supporting the victim after the fact.  Perhaps parole boards should invest in 
greater counseling and health services for victims as they are often the 
primary, if not the only, point of contact between victims and the criminal 
justice system after sentencing.345  In addition, parole boards, given their 
unique position as a conduit between victims and inmates, can facilitate more 
restorative justice models of healing by providing the option for Victim 
Offender Mediation (VOM),346 which has had promising results in 
promoting victims’ well-being.347  States should empower parole boards to 
move beyond linking victim interests with parole release decisions and look 
to other more sustainable ways to address their legitimate needs and interests. 
CONCLUSION 
As the use of discretionary parole release increases, questions about 
victims’ role in the process persist.  These questions often center on the 
general purpose parole release serves, as the level of influence victim input 
has is often dictated by a particular board member’s approach to the release 
decision. 
This Note identified four ways that parole boards approach release 
decisions.  Under the first theory, parole boards may primarily focus on 
rehabilitation and thus assign little to no importance to victim input.  This 
theory lacks explanatory power because victims do exert incredible influence 
in reality.  Under the second theory, parole boards may treat the release 
decision as a resentencing decision that is concerned with considering the 
retributive and deterrent principles of punishment.  This theory does not 
explain how victim testimony is often outcome-determinative.  Under the 
third theory, release is a victim-centric decision.  This theory also falls short 
of explaining how release decisions are made because it appears that, to some 
board members, some victims matter more than others.  Under the fourth 
theory, parole decisions are political decisions that reflect public sentiment 
about victims’ input. 
All of these frameworks present benefits and drawbacks.  Some are 
theoretically persuasive, while others have real explanatory power—or a mix 
of both.  In addition, there is the overarching question of whether victim input 
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should be a factor.  On one hand, permitting victim input poses fairness 
concerns for inmates; on the other hand, shutting victims out of the process 
can also lead to adverse consequences. 
This Note attempts to strike a balance between these extremes and posits 
that board members should evaluate inmates’ rehabilitation as well as the 
extent to which sentencing’s retributive and deterrent goals have been met.  
Thus, victim input should only influence the release decision if it provides 
information showing either that the inmate is not rehabilitated or that the 
judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime.  
Recognizing the implications of this approach, this Note proposes stricter 
requirements for board member qualifications and explanation of decisions.  
Additionally, states should tailor release procedures to minimize the risks of 
secondary harms to victims.  States should give victims the opportunity to be 
heard, but they must be truthful about the weight victims’ input is afforded.  
Finally, states should empower parole boards to move beyond the 
release-deny dichotomy as the principal means to aid victims in their healing. 
